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This thesis examines the feasibility of using an expert system to solve the
threat identification problem in the radar signal environment. Such systems can be
used to support the Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) in decision-making. We have
analyzed the expertise required in electronic warfare (EW) and have identified key
signal parameters. In addition, we have devised a method called function recognition
to facilitate radar signal analysis.
A rule-based prototype system possessing EW knowledge has been designed
and developed for a micro-computer system using the expert system shell CLIPS.
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that are present, perform threat target identification, and suggest the best possible
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Electronic warfare equipment was developed to achieve operational objectives.
From a tactical point of view, the key role of electronic warfare is to intercept the
enemy radiated signals to obtain two elements of tactical information, i.e., warning
and identity. Characteristic signal parameters, such as radio frequency, pulse width,
pulse repetition rate and scan rate, are required to gain this information. They
constitute a form of diagnostic signature that identifies the signal emitter that can
be compared with intelligence information on enemy signal characteristics.
The most important tactical information obtained from the interception of
enemy signals is that relating to target identity which results from analysis of the
signal characteristics. Signal analysis is such an important feature for evaluating
target identify that all modern ESM equipment can be programmed to recognize and
give immediate warning of nominated, specific threat radars which pose potential
dangers requiring very quick* reaction.
The basic requirement of ESM equipment, when used for target identifica-
tion, is fast response and accurate identification. Of course, any automatic ESM
equipment will fail in the target identification process when the intelligence library
contains insufficient data. Also, during combat, the response to a threat must be
in real-time to maintain the safety of the Naval vessel. Therefore, producing a fast
response and correct identification arc vitally important.
Expert systems have been successfully constructed for a wide range of ap-
plications such as speech recognition, medical diagnosis, and signal processing. If
is desirable to apply the expert system technology to electronic warfare to per-
form target identification, which is aimed at assisting the Electronic Warfare Officer
(EWO) in critical operations of a threat environment. In a high density threat
signal environment, the EWO must make major electronic counter measure deci-
sions in response to an enemy signal interception. An example of such a decision is
whether or not the threat signal should be jammed and the procedure to use to jam
the signal. The EWO must make a correct decision in an extremely time-critical
and high-pressure situation and select the appropriate ECM to ensure effectiveness.
The augmentation of the EWO's personal experience into an expert system would
be a valuable tool to help the EWO respond quickly to a wide variety of adverse
situations.
B. PROBLEM
The reasons for using an expert system to aid target identification and decision
making in EW include:
• Reducing the response time in manual target identification based on table look-
up from an Electronic Parameter List (EPL), for ships not equipped with an
automatic ESM system.
• Backing up existing automatic ESM systems that evaluate threat signals against
an EPL. This EPL database is limited to those signals collected from intelli-
gence; when a signal cannot be identified in the database, the system fails.
• Enhance the performance of the less experienced EW personnel.
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
This thesis attempts to design and develop a "rule-based" expert system pro-
totype for target identification, by encoding the expertise of the decision making
process in the area of electronic warfare.
The system receives preprocessed sensor input, determines what radar signals
are present, performs threat identification, and suggests the best possible electronic
counter measure to take.
The goal of this developmental effort is to determine the feasibility and suit-
ability of using an expert system to improve the threat identification capability of
systems currently used aboard naval ships.
D. SCOPE
This thesis will only be concerned with using a rule-based system to perform
threat identification and to aid the EWO in arriving at the best decision. It is not
aimed at the development of a complete, automatic ESM system.
The term "threat" is used extensively throughout this thesis. The threats
comprise different kinds of radars. Additionally, to analyze all of these radar per-
formance characteristics, jamming effectiveness, and to do threat signal analysis is
beyond the scope of this thesis. In developing a rule-based program which involves
threat signal parameters of interest, this thesis will not include classified parameter
material. The unclassified data used to support the thesis program are based on
fictitious data. Any unclassified information about the threat was obtained from
the open literature.
The discussion above illustrates the need for using an intelligent expert system
to aid the decision making process. This process consists of three phases: acquisition,
analysis and display. In the acquisition phase, the expert system receives signal
parameters from the various ESM equipment and intelligence sources and stores that
information in a dynamic database. In the analysis phase, the expert system scans its
database for possible correlations and performs the necessary calculations to verify
the correlation. In the display phase, the expert system indicates target identifying
information and suggests the best possible ECM to supplement the EWO's decision-
making process.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II analyzes the EW
basis signal parameters of interest. It also includes discussions on some functional
recognition methods which are incorporated in the expert system. Chapter III
defines an expert system structure and discusses the development of the rule-based
system. Chapter IV discusses the EW rule-based system program, with examples
showing the behavior of the prototype. Chapter V presents the conclusions arrived
at in this thesis.
II. EXPERT KNOWLEDGE OF ELECTRONIC
WARFARE
A. DEFINITION
Electronic warfare (EW) is an indispensable type of combat which directly
relates to the tremendous progression of electronic technology and has influenced the
characteristics of warfare to the point that this type of combat is essential in today's
conflicts. According to Schleher [Ref. 1], the purpose of EW is to exploit the enemy's
electromagnetic emissions in all parts of the electromagnetic spectrum in order to
provide intelligence on the enemy's order of battle, intention, and capabilities, and
to use counter measures to deny the enemy's effective use of communication and
weapons systems while protecting one's own effective use of the same spectrum.
Even when engaged in relatively simple military operations, there are advantages to
be gained from the use of electronic warfare capabilities.
The definition of electronic warfare is that division of the military employment
of electromagnetic energy involves actions taken to determine, exploit, prevent, or
reduce an enemy's effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy. Electronic war-
fare has three main subdivisions: electronic support measure (ESM), electronic
counter measure (ECM), and electronic counter-counter measure (ECCM). Figure
2.1 indicates the relationships between these three elements. The ESM intercepts
the enemy tactical information for the purpose of threat recognition and for select-
ing the appropriate ECM against the enemy's tactical actions. In addition, it also



























Figure 2.2: Relationship Between ESM and SIGINT
1. Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
ESM is defined as the actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, and
immediately identify radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate
threat recognition and the tactical employment of forces [Ref. 1]. Thus, ESM
provides a source of EW information necessary to conduct ECM, ECCM, and threat
identification. A similar function of ESM is known as signal intelligence (SIGINT).
SIGINT is a generic term that includes both communication intelligence (COMINT)
and electronic intelligence (ELINT). The difference between the ESM function and
the SIGINT function is that ESM focuses on tactical functions and SIGINT is
based on strategic functions. Figure 2.2 indicates the relationship between ESM
and SIGINT.
The EVV systems used for ESM and SIGINT are similar. The difference
is that the information obtained from the ESM is directly accessible to the deci-
sion level, whereas with SIGINT the information access can be either directly or
indirectly related to the decision level. The efforts of SIGINT can also be used to
support ESM. For example, the ESM system can classify the threat signal, due to
the internal programmable library in which parameters are required from SIGINT
to establish the database. SIGINT has two subdivisions, one of which is ELINT.
ELINT's function is to identify the product resulting from the collection, evaluation,
analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information concerning for-
eign nations or areas of operation. Important collection of radar signal parameters
or other signals can be performed during peacetime.
There are many different types of ESM systems which vary greatly in
functional performance characteristics. ESM systems can operate in a very dense
electromagnetic environment. If a. signal is detected, its parameters are determined
and identification can be an automatic operation performed as it is received. In
many situations, the available defensive reaction time is short, therefore, automatic
signal search and recognition without human aid is necessary. An example is a
radar warning receiver (RWR) used in special mission attack platforms that alerts
the commanding officer of detection by enemy tracking radar. RWRs accomplish
this by sensing the signals from threat radars, providing an audio warning signal,
and displaying the warning information on a video screen. All the information
includes either the location or the relative bearing and rank of the threats, in order
of danger, to the commanding officer. Disadvantages of the ESM system depend on
the type of ESM receiver used. For example, in a high signal environment, a tunable
RF crystal video receiver (TRFCYR) can be saturated more easily than other types
of ESM receivers. Because the TRFCVR has a narrow bandwidth, the receiver has
a slow response time for covering a wide frequency range. Another example is the
superheterodyne receiver, which tunes the frequency at any tuning position in a
narrow band. It is much more selective and is less susceptible to saturation in a
dense signal environment. However, tuning over the total frequency range takes a
certain amount of time and signals of interest might be missed.
ESM has several advantages, one of which is that ESM operates in a
completely passive mode. ESM does not radiate electromagnetic energy, and thus
is capable of detecting threats before the threat is capable of detecting the target.
In general, the ESM detection range can be much greater than the radar detection
range. Two methods can be used to calculate the ESM detection range, power
comparison or line-of-sight.
In power comparison, the ESM maximum detection range is affected by
many factors, such as ESM receiver sensitivity, emitter antenna gain, power, etc.
Equation 2.1 describes this factor relationship. Equation 2.2 indicates the maximum
detection range of the ESM receiver.
P
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• Pr = power received by the ESM receiver
• Pt = emitter power
• Gr = ESM antenna gain
• Gt = emitter antenna gain
• A = emitter wavelength
• g = propagation factor
• R = distance between emitter and ESM receiver
• Rmax = maximum detection range of ESM receiver to detect emitter sidelobe
• Smin = ESM receiver sensitivity
• Lp = propagation loss
• L s — system loss
Assume the emitter transmitter power is 100 kW with a frequency of 12 GHz, the
emitter antenna gain is 30 dB, the ESM antenna gain is 30 dB, the ESM system
sensitivity is -94 dBm, and the propagation loss between the emitter and the ESM
receiver is 3 dB. The maximum detection range of such an ESM system is about 300
km. The effective ESM detection range can be subject to severe line-of-sight (LOS)
constraints. Because of the curvature of the Earth (Figure 2.3), there is a limiting
distance at which an ESM antenna has an unobstructed view of the transmitting
antenna. Figure 2.3 shows the case of a smooth earth path. According to Griffiths
[Ref. 2], the ESM maximum detection is calculated by using Equation 2.3.
d = 4.12(fci + kr ) (2.3)
where
• d\ = in ground range from the transmitter (Figure 2.3)
• c?2 = in ground range from the receiver (Figure 2.3)
• d = the ground range between the transmitter and receiver in km
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Figure 2.3: ESM Detect Range Limited by Earth Curvature Effect (This
figure reproduced from Radio wave propagation, J. Griffiths, 1987, pg.
100)
• h t = the heights of the transmitting antennas in meters
• h T = the heights of the receiving antennas in meters
• R = the effective radius of the earth, 7?=8500 km
If both transmitting antenna and receiving antenna are at the same height of 100
m, the maximum detection range of the ESM receiver is 82.4 km.
Although the ESM detection range can be much greater than the radar
detection range, in practical situations (clue to the Earth curvature effect), when
tire ESM detects the presence of a signal from the enemy radar, it may be assumed
the enemy site has made radar contact with the ESM ship. Eigure 2.4 indicates a
typical ESM detection range geometry [Ref. 3].
2. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)
The primary objective of ECM is to deny the use of the electromagnetic
spectrum to the enemy forces in order to allow our own military force to complete
11
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Figure 2.4: Typical ESM Detection Range Geometry (This figure repro-
duced from ICH, 1980, p. 361)
its mission successfully. ECM is defined as actions taken to prevent or reduce the
enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum [Ref. 1]. There are four
types of ECM tactics employed in the EW world, i.e., self-screen jamming (SSJ),
standoff jamming (SOJ), stand forward jamming (SFJ), and escort jamming (EJ).
In SOJ, the jamming platform remains close to but outside of the lethal range of the
enemy radar missile system. In escort jamming, the jamming platform accompanies
the friendly strike vehicles. In standforward jamming, the jamming platform is
positioned between the enemy radar missile systems and the friendly strike vehicles
[Ref. 4]. Self-screening jamming is an ECM technique in which a military vehicle
carries a jammer and an off-board jammer launching system, used to protect itself
from threatening enemy electronic systems. In this thesis, a rule-based system is
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Figure 2.5: Area of ECM
based on the SSJ. Therefore, the knowledge of ECM SSJ concepts as related to the
expert knowledge of EW are briefly discussed in this section.
ECM has two principal areas: active ECM and passive ECM. Active
ECM includes noise jamming and deception, whereas passive ECM includes chaff
and confusion reflectors. The active ECM is the deliberately generated and radiated
radio frequency signals given to compete with true radar reflected signals to disrupt
the intended function of the victim radar or missile. The passive ECM are the
devices designed to reflect the intercepted radar radiation so that the reflections
compete with true target returns and conceal the true target position. Figure 2.5
represents the area of ECM.
a. Jamming
Jamming is an ECM technique used to deny an enemy use of an
electronic system. Jamming is best described as the deliberate radiation or reflection
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of electromagnetic energy to the enemy's defense system so that the system is not
able to extract true data. Noise jamming is the most common form of ECM and is
performed in two basic modes - SPOT and barrage. The basic concept for these two
types of noise jamming are shown in Figure 2.6. In a SPOT jamming, the jammer
must be set onto the threat emitter frequency and must focus the jamming power
into a narrow bandwidth. The bandwidth should be made as narrow as possible to
obtain the maximum power per unit bandwidth.
In the EW world, modern radar employs frequency agility to improve
jamming resistance. Frequency agility is the ability of radar to change its operation
frequency to be effective against SPOT jamming. Since the radar's bandwidth is
increased when the frequency is changes, it will not be efficient in SPOT jamming. In
order to overcome uncertain frequency parameters, barrage jamming may be used.
A barrage jammer requires considerably more effective radiate power (ERP) than
a SPOT jammer to achieve the same jamming effectiveness [Ref. 1]. Therefore,
the power of the jamming signal is actually less than for SPOT jamming when
insufficient power is used in barrage. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
For example, if a jammer ERP is 50 kW and the bandwidth is 5 MHz for SPOT
jamming and a wider bandwidth is 500 MHz for barrage jamming, the maximum
jammer power in a given bandwidth is f^j = 10^ and b^^VHz = 0.1^ for
barrage jamming.
ERP is defined as the product of the transmitted power and the
antenna gain. While a high ERP is desirable, the use of a very high-gain antenna
may cause disadvantages in this method. A very high-gain antenna implies a very
narrow beam. It may be difficult to keep such a narrow beam on the victim if the
victim is moving rapidly. Also, a very narrow beam might not permit simultaneous
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Figure 2.6: SPOT Jamming and Barrage Jamming
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should include the consideration of two aspects, radar sidelobe jamming and the
jammer to signal power ratio, J/S.
(1) Sidelobe Jamming
Low sidelobes are generally desired for radar systems. However,
antenna designers prefer to design radar systems with a high mainlobe and lower
sidelobe antennae. Otherwise, if a large portion of the radiated energy were to
concentrate in the sidelobe, a reduction in the main-beam energy would occur with
a consequent reduction in radar system sensitivity. According to Skolnik [Ref. 5], if
the sidelobe levels are higher, a strong echo signal could enter the receiver and appear
as a false target. Jamming via the radar sidelobe can result in serious degradation
of radar performance as the radar pattern is composed of the mainlobe and several
sidelobes into which noise is received. This can result in the indication of strong
echoes on the radar plan position indicator (PPI), making it difficult for the radar
operator to extract correct target information.
(2) Self Screen Jam-to-Signal Ratio {J/S)
In practical ECM jamming systems, it is desirable to under-
stand the fundamental relationship between the J/S ratio required at the victim's
receiver to remain undetected and the noise quality of the jammer.
The J/S radio is defined as the relationship of the effective
jamming signal power in the victim electronic system bandwidth to the desired
signal power. Both are measured at the same place and time in the jammed receiver
[Ref. 4]. To get an estimate of the necessary power required for the jammer, the
following calculations are used.
=
Pt x Gr P G T x A 2
4tt x R2 Att x R2 4tt
(47r) 3#» K ' '
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where
• S = received echo signal power
• Pt = radar power output
• GT = radar antenna gain
• p = radar cross section of a target
• A = wavelength
• R = distance between radar and target
• F = propagation factor
A non-free-space environment will change the E field arriving
at the receiving antenna. The component E picked up by the receiving antenna
can be different from that in a free-space situation, E . The ratio
|
^- | is called
the propagation factor. The propagation factor in the equation above illustrated
two-way propagation, e.g., E4 . Jammer power in the receiver bandwidth is:
_
PjGjBrGr ^ 2F . .
J
~ WIPBjL, [ }
where
• J = Jammer signal power at radar
• Pj = Jammer power output
• Gj = Jammer antenna gain
• Br = Radar bandwidth
• GT = Radar antenna gain (sidelobe)
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• A = Wavelength
• R = Distance between jammer and radar
• Bj = Jammer bandwidth
• L p = Polarization loss
• F = Propagation factor (one way propagation)
The jammer uses a "slant" antenna or circularly polarized radar. In either case, Lp
is 2 for horizontally or vertically polarized radars [Ref. 6].
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Equation 2.7 can be used to find the power required of a jam-
mer. For example, assume J/S is dB for noise jamming, radar frequency is 8 GHz,
the radar polarization is horizontal, the radar ERP is 250 mW, the BW is 5 MHz,
the jammer antenna gain is 20 dB with BW of 100 MHz, the attack boat RCS is 10
m2
,
the jammer ship RCS is 20,000 m2
,
the distance between the jammer and radar
is 30 nm, the propagation factor is dB, then
Pj x 100 x 5 MHz x 4tt x 3.24 x 10 10
250 x 106 x 100 MHz x 20000 x 1.99 ( * '
250 x 106 x 100 x 20000 x 1.99
100 x 5 x 4?r x 3.24 x 10 1
= 4.9 W/MHz (2.11)
Z,<JU A U A UU A iUUUU A 33
3 ~ inn., c ., ^_..on.( ., iqio V /
From the calculation, the minimum power required for the distance of 30 nautical
miles is about 4.9 W/MHz.
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b. Deception
Deception is defined as the deliberate radiation, reirradiation, alter-
ation, absorption, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to
mislead a hostile force in the interpretation or use of information received by its
electronic system [Ref. 1].
The objective of deception is to provide a means of protection against
radar systems. Protection is accomplished by using deceptive amplified and repeated
pulsed RF signals received from a threat radar. This is different from noise jamming
which tries to overwhelm the radar systems with noise, making the extraction of the
real data difficult. However, noise jamming is not an appropriate technique for
tracking radar [Ref. 1]. One reason is that the tracking radar requires azimuth,
elevation, and range to determine the present target position, therefore, the noise
signal which allows the fire control or missile guidance system for calculation or
correlation processing. A second reason is that noise jamming can only deny range
information and not angle information. If the power of a noise jammer is not enough
when the noise signal goes into the main lobe, the radar operator can still get
azimuth information.
A significant advantage of deception jamming is that the power re-
quired is less than noise jamming. Since the noise jamming is operated in almost
100% of the duty cycle, peak power equals average power. The deception jammer
generating the pulse is matched with the radar's pulse, operating at a duty cycle
equal to that of the tracking radar.
One example of deception jamming is known as range gate pulloff
(RGPO). Tracking systems use range gates to detect the range of a target echo. The
gates are adjusted by the tracking system in order to keep radar tracking efficient.
The objective of the range deception jammer is to steal the gate by forcing the
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gate to a position other than the true echo. This range gate pullofF technique is
commonly employed. The RGPO function is accomplished via the interaction of
the radar and deception jammer. The deception jammer is a repeater that is always
triggered by radar pulse. The pulse is retransmitted with the same width but a
higher amplitude back to the radar to capture the radar automatic gain control
circuit. Once the gate is completely in the pullofF stage, the repeater turns off,
causing the true target to disappear from the tracking system. During this period
the target range information is incorrect with the degree of range error depending
on the pullofF time. The maximum time is generally about 20 //s and could cause a
distance error of as much as 3200 yards.
c. Passive Electronic Countermeasure
(1) Chaff
Chaff is the oldest and one of the most widely used radar coun-
termeasures [Ref. 1]. Chaff is an intentional clutter generator, consisting of quan-
tities of radar reflecting material. Such large quantities of reflecting material can
produce significant clutter, saturating threat systems and providing false targets,
thereby confusing a radar operator. Chaff is a collection of small segments of alu-
minum foil cut to lengths of approximately one-half the wavelength of the radar
frequency band of interest.
For naval applications, the purpose of chaff is to provide self
protection and to provide false targets to confuse the threat radar with false infor-
mation. The effectiveness of chaff depends on the current situation and its intended
use. If an outside intelligence source is unavailable, the ship must operate indepen-
dently and relies on its own ESM system or radar. Radar is an active sensor limited
by the emission control (EMCON) policy. Therefore, most early warning informa-
tion is derived from the ESM system. Additionally, since the purpose of the chaff
20
is to provide self protection from missile attack or to confuse the radar operator,
appropriate action tactics should be considered in the decision-making effort before
firing. Figure 2.7 illustrates the proper procedure in a period of war.
Two major factors are considered when determining the appro-
priate time for firing the chaff, the seeker activating range from the ship and the
chaff cloud forming time. For example, if the activated seeker is 10 nautical miles
away, the chaff's units will burst open and form a cloud in approximately 15 seconds,
if the missile speed is 250 m/sec, the chaff will produce the lock transfer function
at 14 seconds if the chaff is fired at 14 nautical miles. However, a missile seeker
is generally activated much closer to a target ship. If the chaff is still fired at 14
nautical miles for a missile seeker activated at 6 nautical miles away from the ship,
the lock transfer function of a chaff will not be effective since the missile seeker has
its own operational characteristics.
A discussion of missile seekers is beyond the scope of this thesis.
(2) IR Flare
The purpose of using an IR flare is to guard against an IR
seeking missile. The IR seeker provides the information to position a target for the
missile system. The IR seeker can lock onto a ship's smoke stack exhaust gases,
as the gases provide a large transmittance. Radiation is emitted in the 3-5 jim. IR
region with its contribution of heat radiation area at about 20 m 2 . The difference
of contrast between the ship's temperature and its own background temperature is
the determinant factor for the success of an IR guided missile. At a large distance,
the ship acts as a point source if a flare is fired. However, the flare has more
thermal power than the ship and the missile is thus distracted by the IR flare. As
the temperature of the flare decreases, its effectiveness decreases as it radiates out




























Figure 2.7: A Basic Procedure for Firing a Chaff and IR Flare
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locking onto the ship's radiation area and could result in the missile centroid mode.
To protect the ship from the IR seeking missile, the IR flare should be fired when
the missile signal is intercepted by the ESM system as early as possible to avoid
missile centroid mode.
B. KNOWLEDGE OF THREAT SIGNAL PARAMETERS
The purpose of the intercepted signal is to locate the enemy emission source
position and to identify the threat signal. The most important tactical information
that can be obtained from an intercept of enemy signals relates to target identifica-
tion by the analysis of the signal characteristics [Ref. 7]. An EW operator must be
able to operate the ESM system efficiently to support decision making, but the ESM
system must be able to intercept the signal and accurately process the many param-
eters from the emitter. The principal radar parameters of interest are frequency,
pulse width (PW), pulse repetition frequency (PRF), scan rate, modulation type,
PRF stability, etc. Unfortunately, in today's high density electronic environment,
different electronic systems have closely similar parameters. Parameters of systems
associated with a generic threat vary somewhat from system to system causing am-
biguous identification. Deep analysis of signal parameters is beyond the scope of
this thesis, but the most important concept of signal parameter characteristics is
related to expert knowledge of EW, as discussed in this section.
1. Frequency
Since electromagnetic waves propagate in air with oscillations occurring
at different rates, a frequency is defined as the number of cycles of the signal os-
cillation observed at any point in the signal per unit time. In the EW field, the
necessary measure of frequency is the carrier frequency of a signal. The deter-
mination of carrier frequency provides valuable information which can aid target
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recognition. If the carrier frequency is measured, an approximation of the evalua-
tion of the target can be identified. Basically, a lower frequency indicates a larger
antenna, higher power, higher gain, narrow beam and longer detect ranges. Higher
frequencies indicate a smaller antenna, lower power, lower gain, wider beamwidth,
higher doppler response, and shorter detection range. There are some limitations
to be aware of when measuring carrier frequency. The accuracy of radio frequency
(RF) measurement is subject to man)' variables, as listed below [Ref. 7]
• The accuracy of the available frequency standard.
• The available signal-to-noise ratio for single pulses and the ability of the re-
ceiver system to integrate a number of pulses.
• Doppler shifts due to motion of the emitter or the receiver.
The ability to measure frequency depends on the ESM receiver perfor-
mance and EW operator training. The EW operator is important because the EW
operator introduces a human factor, reflected by coordination with the ESM equip-
ment and its functional operation.
Another important efFect that should be considered when intercepting
frequency is known as the doppler shift. Doppler shift occurs due to motion of the
emitter or the receiver, and is defined as the difference in frequency between the
transmitted signal and the received signal. When doppler shift occurs, the true
carrier frequency needs to be calculated from radar or by other means. The doppler
shift frequency calculation between two platforms is given below. [Ref. 7]




• j = carrier frequency
• vr = radial velocity
• c = speed of light
• jd = doppler shift
The doppler shift introduces error in target recognition because of changes intro-
duced in the radio frequency measurement. These changes, up to several kHz, can
alter the RF parameters of a radar.
2. Pulse Width
The pulse width (PW) is also called pulse duration. The pulse duration
represents the RF energy that was transmitted by the radar in a time period, with
the PW defined as the time between the half power points. The envelope of the
pulse determines the radar range resolution and also helps to identify the signal
type.
Larger PWs indicate large and powerful radars such as those found at
landbased sites or on ships. Medium and small PWs are found on ships and aircraft
where power generation is limited. Often, modulation products are visible on top
of the pulse, aiding in recognition.
These modulation products result from the operating characteristic of the
system and display themselves as amplitude variations of the pulse shape (Figure
2.8). The amplitude modulation on pulse (AMOP) could be caused by background
clutter, such as mountains. Phase and frequency modulation radars can be identified
by looking at their pulses on an oscilloscope. Sometimes, these characteristics are
helpful in discriminating between signals with similar parameters. Phase transversal
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Figure 2.8: Amplitude Modulation on Pulse (AMOP) on an Oscilloscope
(change) is noted by small "glitches" (Figure 2.9) on the pulse, identifying the radar
as being phase modulated.
Frequency modulated radars are detected by noting the pulse width as
the platform's ESM receiver bandwidth changes. If the pulse width decreases with
decreasing bandwidth, the observed air search radar pulse is identified as frequency
modulated, or "chirp". If the pulse width remains constant as the bandwidth is
varied, no frequency modulation is used. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 demonstrates the
concept of measuring the pulse of a frequency modulation radar. Figure 2.12 indi-
cates the CHIRP pulse signal in frequency domain.
By observing the presence of noise (sometimes called grass) on the pulse
trailing edge (Figure 2.13), it is possible to determine if the platform's ESM system is




















Figure 2.10: Select Different Bandwidths on an ESM Receiver to Iden-
tify Frequency Modulation Radar; PW varies with Different Bandwidth
selected
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Figure 2.13: "Grass" on the Pulse Trailing Edge Indicates the Aircraft
is Detected by the Radar Main Lobe
the detection envelope of the latter. It is often valuable to know the probability of
being detected by certain radars.
During air combat, the aircraft uses "penetrate aids" to penetrate a threat
radar sidelobe. To prevent the aircraft from being defected by the radar main lobe,
the pilot observes the presence of a pulse trailing edge and could take appropriate
action.
3. Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF)
The PRF is an important factor to help the EW operator identify radar
performance. One duty is to check the radar's maximum unambiguous range, de-






• Ru = Maximum unambiguous range
• PRI = Pulse repetition interval
• C = Speed of light
An EW operator can find the radar's maximum detection range by using
the PRF parameters of a radar signal. The radar detection range can be calculated
by using Equation 2.13. For example, if the ESM receiver's measure of the PRF is
1500 pulses per second, the maximum unambiguous range for this radar is about 100
km. In general, a higher PRF is designed for fire control radar as target information
data for radar receiver processing is needed. The search radar has a lower PRF to
satisfy a necessary longer detection range.
To avoid the problem of radar blind speed, the PRF of a radar can be
changed within a range in a pseudo-random fashion. This modulation technique is
known as "PRF jitter" and often has the additional benefit of making the radar
more resistive to false target jamming. The range of this technique "jitters" rapidly
about some mean value. The range of the jitter and the mean value are additional
aids to signal recognition. An oscilloscope can be used to determine the width of
the jitter excursion and a mean value of the PRF is estimated as lying within the
center of this range. To find out the radar's PRF jitter range, one should measure
the PRF first. As most radar has a maximum jitter value of 10% (AN/SPS-67),
the jitter ratio is therefore 7.5% in the example where a radar's PRI = 1333 /is. To
find out the jitter width, first, we use 7.5% multiple 1333 /js, the result of one site
width is about 100 //s. However, the range of this "jitter" is around the mean or at
a width of 200 //s. Figures 2.14 and 2.15 illustrate the PRF jitter condition.
Another modulation type commonly employed is that of the "PRF stag-
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Figure 2.14: PRF Jitter View on Oscilloscope






Figure 2.16: PRF Stagger Scan-to-Scan; antenna rotates twice, but both
rotations cannot be seen at the same time on the oscilloscope
to eliminate problems of distance ambiguity and doppler speed. This type of mod-
ulation is usually used for air search radar and can be used by the EW operator for
emitter identification.
The PRF can be switched on a pulse-to-pulse basis, or be kept on for
a much longer period, roughly the time duration of one radar scan, labeled "scan-
to-scan". Staggers are readily observable on the analysis oscilloscope and are yet
another aid to recognition. The EW operator should understand that the scan-to-
scan stagger PRF changes the PRF on an antenna, rotation basis. It is impossible to
observe the stagger PRF simultaneously on an analysis oscilloscope. The pulse-to-
pulse stagger PRF is a different situation as it changes PRF on a PRI basis. Figures
2.16 through 2.19 show several kinds of stagger PRF.
The radar's PRF has a very important, characteristic performance known
as "PRF stability". The PRF stability of an intercepted radar signal is a key factor
in helping the EW operator to identify the emitter platform. The actual stability of
a radar's PRF is dependent upon the stability of its timing mechanism. This timing
mechanism synchronizes the entire system and is usually a stable oscillating circuit
or a crystal. Different radars are stable to differing degrees. These variances can be
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Figure 2.17: PRF Stagger "pulse-to-pulse" 2 element, 2 position
1 1 1 , ,
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Figure 2.18: PRF Stagger "pulse-to-pulse" 2 element, 3 position















Figure 2.20: Fine PRF Measurement Using Standard Equipment
exploited for the discrimination or identification of radars. Accurate measurement
requires a very stable time base in the ESM analysis equipment. Stability cannot be
measured to a higher degree than that available by a particular system. The need
for a temperature stable oscillator in the range of ± 0.0002 seconds is a requirement
of a significant peacetime ELINT database. Figure 2.20 shows the whole system set
up for measuring the fine PRF.
4. Scan Rate
Radar antenna scan rate is defined as the time required for one scan or
cycle of the antenna to be completed. Since the radar pattern frequently shows
amplitude variation, the measurment of the scan rate by automatic means can in-
troduce ambiguity in finding the radar main beam; consequently, the intervention
of an human operator may be required to resolve this detection ambiguity. The
EW operator attenuates the receiving gain on the ESM receiver to make reception
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of only the main lobe possible. The operator measures the complete cycle time
when the antenna main lobe passes the ESM antenna. The time measurement is
the scan rate. Scan rate is a valuable parameter to determine the radar's function.
For example, a surveillance radar has a scan rate of about 15 RPM (4 seconds for
one complete cycle). A multiple function radar scan rate can vary as the radar's
function mode changes. The function mode can be changed to increase the number
of pulses received by a radar, thus increasing the signal-to-noise ratio and improving
the radar's detection capability.
Measurement of the scan rate is also dependent upon the type of the scan,
posing a difficult problem for automatic systems. Circular scans are measured in
seconds, or tens of seconds, whereas conical scans are measured in tens of Hz. The
method of analysis requires first the identification of the scan type, then applying the
appropriate measures to define the rate. Circular and sector scans may be measured
with a stopwatch; however, complex fire control scans require an oscilloscope and a
frequency counter for human operators. An automatic system must first be able to
distinguish between the main lobe and the side lobes for scan determination. Based
upon this information, the automatic system must be able to alter the process by
which the periodic detection of energy is translated into a scan rate. This is not an
easy problem.
C. SIGNAL RECOGNITION
The accuracy of radar recognition in automatic systems is a function of the
accuracy of the input parameters and the completeness of the parameter library. The
large number of radars used by military organizations and the civilian community
have made the radar spectrum a crowded place. Often, parameters overlap in every
area. In these cases, knowledge of geography, order of battle, or the tactical situation
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must be used to determine the correct emitter type. Also, expert knowledge of signal
types is important for accurate recognition.
There are conceivably many instances when a military organization could be
forced to fight against systems with unknown parameters. The ability to determine
a threat is only as good as the database. If an automatic system encounters a set of
parameters that is unknown, the signal should be assigned to a human analyst to
perform an analysis of "functional recognition". Functional recognition is defined
when a radar's parameters do not fit a library entry. The next best option is to
determine the "function" of the radar and to determine if the signal constitutes a
threat.
Functional recognition is based on the premise that the physical operating pa-
rameters of the radar basically tell what the radar is used for. This is critical for
enemy systems that pose a severe threat. For example, missile homing radars in the
noses of surface-to-surface missiles all look "electronically similar". Without prior
information, it may not be possible to identify the exact type of missile. However,
for the tactical scenario at hand, a missile has been detected and appropriate coun-
termeasures must be determined. The categories for such recognition are broad and
not easily defined, leading to high false alarm rates. Nevertheless, false alarms are
tolerated more easily than missile hits. Table 2.1 lists parameter ranges and their
functional equivalents. Figure 2.21 indicates the procedure of target identification.
Figure 2.22 illustrates the signal functional recognition and Figures 2.23 and 2.24
illustrate various types of radar signal functional recognition flowcharts.
3G



















RF 8 -- 10 GHZ
100 •- 400 MHZ
OR
1 -- 3 QHZ
8 — 9 GHZ
OR
8 — 6 GHZ
100 -- 300 MHZ 8 — 10 GHZ
PRF 1500 --2600 PP3
160 -- 300 PPS
OR
iooo -- teoo pra
•00 -- «00 PPS
OR
1100 -- 1»00 PP9
180 -- 400 MHZ 3000 -- eooo ppb


















































































































PRF is 600-2000 pps
























































Figure 2.24: Functional Recognition for Several Types of Radar
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III. EXPERT SYSTEM CONCEPTS
A. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Expert System
1. AI Definitions and Concepts
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a branch of computer science, the art of
making systems for the intelligence community. The field of artificial intelligence
offers solutions for complex problem solving. Patrick H. Winston, director of the
artificial intelligence laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, writes:
The goals of artificial intelligence are to make computers more useful and to
understand the principles which make intelligence possible. [Ref. 8]
AI is concerned with the programming of computers to perform tasks that are
presently manually performed. A I technology can therefore lead to a number of
useful applications. The design of A I research is to create computer programs that
capture the knowledge and reasoning processes of highly intelligent specialists. In
recent years, there has been an explosive growth in the number of military AI systems
oriented toward providing operational status, advice and information to the military
decision makers. One of the best examples of military applications related to EW
is the Large Area Surveillance Sensor System (AELASS) [Ref. 9]. The AELASS
system is oriented toward providing better use of surveillance mode data including
the detection of targets, the maintenance of an activity level history, and estimates
of enemy activity levels.
The AELASS system operates via the rule-base component which con-
tains the knowledge utilized for the system analysis of indicators and activities. [Ref.
9] The rule base is composed of expert knowledge in the form of rules. A rule is a
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collection of conditions and the actions to be taken if the conditions are met. In
this thesis, a rule-based program is developed to perform threat identification and
is discussed in Chapter IV.
2. Expert System Definition and Concept
a. What is an Expert System?
An expert system is a computer program that possesses knowledge
on a specialized subject and solves problems or gives advice about that subject. [Ref.
10] The expert system field provides methods and techniques to aid users in solving
real-world problems. They are also called knowledge-based systems because they re-
quire domain-specific knowledge necessary for solving problems. A knowledge-based
system applies rules of thumb to a symbolic representation of knowledge, rather
than employing algorithmic method. This knowledge is obtained by a knowledge
engineer who gathers knowledge from domain-specific experts about a particular
subject. The knowledge, then, is used to develop the knowledge base for use in an
expert system. A knowledge base in the abstract sense consists of descriptions and
procedures, expressed as facts and rules, in an expert domain. A knowledge based
system is commonly referred to as a rule-based system since most problem solving
strategies are encoded as rules.
Information about the problem to be solved can be incomplete or
unreliable and relations is the problem domain can be approximate. For example,
we may not be able to measure the same emitter signal simultaneous from various
types of ESM with the same result, or know that the measurement data is absolutely
correct. This requires probability reasoning.
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b. Basic Structure of an Expert System
Three basic elements of an expert system are: a knowledge base, an
inference engine, and a user interface. The knowledge base contains domain-specific
knowledge, represented by rules that specify the action to be carried out when
prerequisite conditions are satisfied. The rules are acquired from human experts and
are normally expressed as condition-action pairs similar to an IF-THEN statement:
IF certain conditions are true
THEN perform the following actions
The inference engine uses information presented in the rule base to
infer conclusions and to control overall execution. It can be regarded as a rule
interpreter. The reference engine consists of procedures that determine the correct
application of the rules. It also controls the order of rule activation and rule selection
when more than one rule are applicable. A user interface provides a mechanism for
information interchange between the user and the expert system. The interface and
the inference engine may be viewed as one module, called a shell or an expert system
shell. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic expert system architecture.
B. EXPERT SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
The main elements which relate to the expert system are the human expert,
the development tool, the knowledge engineer, and the user. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the expert system process and each of the basic element functions.
A knowledge engineer is the person who acquires the knowledge from the
domain expert and transports it to the knowledge base. The domain expert is
a knowledgeable person who tells the knowledge engineer what rules to add or
modify. The knowledge engineer discusses these with the domain expert and makes
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Figure 3.2: An Expert System Process
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An expert system development tool is the programming language tied in with
associated support facilities and is utilized by the knowledge engineer to build an
expert system. These tools differ from procedural programming languages such
as Pascal, Ada, FORTRAN, or C. In this thesis, a knowledge base is developed
in CLIPS, and expert system shell written in C [Ref. 11]. Facts are essential to
complete an execution in CLIPS. A fact consists of one or more fields enclosed in
matching left and right parentheses. For example, (Steady Scan) has two fields
while (Steady-Scan) has only one field. The basic elements of CLIPS are the fact-
list, the global memory for data, the knowledge-base containing all the rules, and
the inference engine which controls the overall execution.
The user is the human who applies the system's expertise in solving a specific
task. For the purpose of this thesis, the user is the EW operator or anyone who needs
to use the system. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the user operation of the system to reach
an answer, the knowledge engineer refining the existing knowledge in the system,
and a domain expert adding new knowledge and running the modified system.
C. A Rule-Based System for EW
This section provides our view in applying expert system technology to EW.
It should be emphasized that the purpose is to provide a tool to aid, instead of to
replace, the EW operators in decision-making.
1. A Typical Scenario at Sea
This thesis attempts to develop a "rule-based" expert system proto-
type for target identification and decision making for counter measure in the area
of electronic warfare. It is aimed at improving the target identification capability of
systems currently used aboard naval ships. A basic structure of an expert system

















Figure 3.3: The Structure of a Ship's EW Rule Based System
that the use of an expert system aids the ESM system in performing target identi-
fication. The signals of interest are intercepted by the ESM receiver and tuned to
obtain the basic signal parameters, which include the RE, PRE, PVV, and scan rate.
The expert system receives the basic parameters from the ESM receiver and allows
these input parameters to give the best correlation in a programmable rule-based
system. When correlation processing is complete, the expert system displays the
information for decision making to the Commanding Officer.
Most fleet ships in the current navies employ the ESM system to
perform the warning and identification mission. ESM systems installed on ships
rely on the ship's design purpose and the mission characteristics. Automatic ESM
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systems are employed if ships are conducting operational missions. However, man-
ually operated ESM systems tend to be used in the ship's non-operational missions,
for example, logistic support.
An automatic ESM system performing automatic target identifica-
tion does not require a rule based system unless the following conditions are appli-
cable:
• The threat library database is limited to only signal parameters collected from
ELINT or if the library contains insufficient data.
• If the reserve mode of a certain emitter has been changed by the enemy during
combat.
The scenario considered here is that of a naval ship performing a
patrol mission in a specific area. Ships equipped with nonautomated ESM systems
must perform manual target identification. The object of the ESM mission is to ob-
tain and process the intercepted signals accurately. Although the ship's EW system
is staffed by competent and experienced operators, their vigilance, enthusiasm, and
effectiveness may be severely reduced in a dense electronic environment when using
manual equipment. This could be a result of fatigue caused by a ship's long patrol
or other operational constraints. As the EW view is tasked to evaluate and report
intercepted signals to the combat information center officer (CICO), the EW oper-
ator may sometimes make incorrect evaluations, as a result of the factors described
above. Tactical decisions made by the ship's commanding officer rely heavily upon
the resultant target identified by the EW operator. Although automatic ESM sys-
tems are employed on ships, target identification and evaluation is still completed
via a human operator unless the threat library is sufficiently informed and accurate.
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Thus, the EW operators play an indispensable role in the commanding officer's de-
cision making process. Any mistake made by the EW operators can precipitate
potentially unsafe consequences to the ship.
2. Advantages of an EW Rule-Based System
The following are the advantages that might be gained with the EW
rule-based system:
• A decrease in the average processing time needed to identify a threat by EW
operator
• A decrease in the probability of human errors in the complex and dense elec-
tronic environment
• Can be used as an EW subsystem to generate a functional recognition method
to overcome the unknown situation.
3. Main Structure of EW Rule-Based System
We have discussed the purpose of an expert system and the impor-
tance of using a rule-based system. The EW rule- based system is used as an EW
subsystem. The system receives preprocessed ESM receiver inputs, determines what
radar signals are present, performs threat target identification, and suggests the best
possible electronic counter measure. If the system does not correlate with the in-
put signal parameters, an "unknown" situation occurs. Unknown problems can be
solved with the use of the system's functional recognition.
According to the above system's capability description, a design of
the ship's EW rule-based system structure is shown in Figure 3.3. This system
consists of the following units:
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a. Inference Engine
The primary role of the inference engine is the control and use of
the knowledge presented in the rule base and input data.
b. Rule Base
The rule base contains knowledge information data written in rule
form for inferencing, allocating, and consulting procedures.
c. Display
The display unit provides output information to the decision level
and allows the EW operator to input information. This information exchange is
completed by using a keyboard, a terminal, and a mouse.
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IV. AN EXPERT SYSTEM FOR EW
A. PROGRAM STRUCTURE
This electronic warfare rule-based system is written in CLIPS, an expert sys-
tem shell created by Artificial Intelligence Section (AIS) at NASA/Johnson Space
Center (JSC). CLIPS specifically provides high portability, low cost, and easy inte-
gration with external systems. The primary method of representing expert knowl-
edge within CLIPS is in the form of rules. The rules, as discussed in Chapter III,
are acquired from the domain-expert and are normally in the form of CONDITION-
ACTION pairs such as:
IF the measured signal is steady scan (condition)
THEN the source may be a missile (action)
Figure 4.1 shows an example of some EW rules. The rules are designed and
stored in the knowledge base according to the threat parameters for a specific generic
area. The system program contains two parts, the threat parameter database and
the functional recognition database (See Appendix A). The system program operates
in a forward-chaining mode, a type of data driven control strategy in which rules
are applied to the fact or object attributes for the formulation of an hypothesis.
B. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
The computer used for the rule-based system prototype program is an IBM-
PC compatible minicomputer system running MS-DOS 4.01 operating system. The
computer system requires 3.75M bytes hard disk and 640K bytes of RAM to run
the EW rule-base program.
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(defrule input -1
=> (printout t crlf ''Can you see modulation?'' crlf)
(assert (modulation = (read))))
(defrule mod (modulation no)
=> (printout t "FREQ larger than 10 GHZ?" crlf )
(assert (FREQ = (read))))
(defrule case (FREQ yes)
=> (printout t ''noise like or sinusoid signal on the oscilloscope?'' crlf)
(assert (Noiselike-Sinusoid Signal yes)
(defrule NLSS (Noiselike-Sinusoid Signal yes)
=> (printout t crlf ''strong signal audio?'' crlf)
(assert (strong-audio = (read))))
(defrule strong-audio (strong-audio yes)
=> (printout t "CW illuminator lock ON'' crlf))
Figure 4.1: An Example of EW Rule Base for CW Illuminator Status
A notable characteristic designed for this system is that the rule base program
can be improved at the EW expert knowledge level rather than at the level of the
design program. Thus, modifications may be made directly to the expert knowledge
domain in the rule-base, rather than modifying the structure of the program.
Another characteristic of the system is that the rule-based system program
operates by logical reasoning rather than by calculation, such as that used in other
types of programs. An important component of the rule-base is the number of facts,
representing related information, stored in fact-lists in the computer memory. Rules
are executed based on the existence or non-existence of these facts.
C. SYSTEM OPERATION
The EW rule-based system operates by a data driven control strategy. This
approach is started when the EW operator inputs information into the rule-based
system. The inference engine then selects a knowledge source and scans for any
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rules that can be fired, applies these rules towards generating a conclusion, and
then waits for further input until a final goal is reached.
When the rule is compiled to start the system, the user is presented with
menus to initiate the program. The user will be asked for input. The EW opera-
tor then keys the known basic signal parameters into the expert system for target
identification. If an unknown situation occurs, the program allows the EW operator
to perform functional recognition. To support the EWO decision making effort, the
rule base contains some ECM techniques that can be suggested to allow a correct
ECM decision.
D. SYSTEM LIMITATIONS
Absolutely perfect target identification systems do not exist in the EW world.
Using an automatic ESM system allows for operation in a dense radar environment
with the ability to perform threat identification. To meet the requirements, the
ESM system must provide the capability to overcome a complex signal of a radar
scan pattern. However, an automatic ESM system has some process limitations
when dealing with such a radar signal. For example, both monopulse or conscan
radars exhibit a steady scan signal, which is difficult to measure with a computer-
based ESM system. This is also true if an intercepted signal exhibits a missile lock
onto the ESM site. However, this problem may be solved when the programmable
library of emitter data contains sufficient knowledge. The following questions will
be addressed in this case: How is the intelligence source guaranteed to provide such
complete information to the ESM system? What indication is there that the enemy
will not use the reserve mode during combat? These questions must be answered
via a functional recognition method.
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Ships using non-automatic ESM systems have their own limitations. In Chap-
ter III, we discussed a generic scenario for a ship at sea. We understand that the
ESM system operates manually, and that effectiveness is affected by various envi-
ronment factors. In this thesis, a prototype program was developed to determine
the feasibility and suitability of a rule-based system that could improve the threat
identification capability of non-automatic ESM systems currently used aboard naval
ships. The prototype was evaluated to determine the potential of its use as an EW
subsystem by running a simulation program. In general, the prototype EW rule-base
system was found to have the limitations described below:
1. System Response Time
The current EW rule-based system requires manual input and therefore,
the time required for target identification relies on the human input response time.
2. Threat Library Parameters Overlapping
Any ESM system faces an increasingly complex signal environment. The
EW rule-based system effectiveness decreases due to signal ambiguities in the threat
environment.
3. Unknown Situation
The system program uses four signal parameters to perform threat iden-
tification, one of which is the scan rate. The scan rate is difficult to measure when
the intercepted signal has the property of a complex scan. Threat identification




This section provides simulation reults to examine how closely the system's
performance meets the design objectives. Test runs performed for various threat
signal situations are listed below.
1. Case 1: Surface Search/Missile-Targeting Radar Operating in









"This is Square Tie Radar in Navigation Mode"









"Square Tie in Combat Mode!!"
"Fire Chaff!!"
"IF no/low modulation fire IR flare"
"ECM choice countdown
-f swept audio + noise'
Reset system
Note: "/:" is the system prompt and the user input is shown in italic.
This scenario depicts the situation in which the threat emitter can be used
for operation in the multimode function, i.e., navigation mode and combat mode.
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The radar is designed to provide the necessary information to the missile system.
There are some different signal parameter ranges between the navigation mode and
combat mode due to the radar's operational function. In combat mode, the radar
signal parameter has been changed within certain ranges when it is compared to
the radar navigation mode. This change does not affect the type of radar to be
used. The system can distinguish this situation and will suggest the best electronic
counter measure to be taken.
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2. Case 2: A Various Type of Emitter Functional Recognition



















Is scan type circular?
/•' yes
RF is 5 GHz, PRF is 600-2000 pps, PW is 0.1 in 2 fisl
/•• y









Conical scan radar in scan mode
Modulation?
/; n
Conical scan radar lock-on or monopulse radar
Reset system
Note: "/•'" is the system prompt and the user input is shown in italic.
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In this case, the ship's ESM system intercepts the signal, and since the
rule-base library was insufficient, an unknown situation occurred. The use of func-




This thesis emphasizes using an expert system approach for the design of an
electronic warfare threat identification system. This method can improve the ship's
nonautomatic ESM system and assist the electronic warfare operator in performing
target identification. The system can also assist the Electronic Warfare Officer in
making the best ECM decision in a threat signal environment.
Chapter I outlined the objectives and problems of building such a system.
Chapter II presented the basics of the Electronic Warfare domain knowledge. Chap-
ter III enumerated basic concepts of expert system structures and presented a real
encounter situation when non-automatic ESM systems are used. Chapter IV pre-
sented our prototype implementation and demonstrated its use through several sim-
ulation runs.
B. FUTURE WORK
The simulation results in the previous chapter have sufficiently demonstrated
the feasibility of using a knowledge based expert system in the EW domain. To
provide real time information to the EW operator, or EW officer, the system needs
to be fully integrated into the ship's ESM and weapon systems. Future efforts should
address the possibility for expert systems to maintain the present situation at all
times, rather than to wait for manual inputs. The goal of a fully integrated EW
rule-based system will be a complicated task, but is essential for the future success




; This is a rule base of EW for functional
; recognition, file created by LCDR
: WEN CHENG HSIUNG R.O.C Navy
(defrule case-1
= >
(printout t " Can you see modulation ? " crlf)
(assert ( modulation =(read))))
(defrule case-2 (modulation no)
= >
(printout t " Frequency larger than 10 GHZ ? "
crlf)




(printout t " noise like or sinusoid signal on
the oscilloscope ? " crlf)









(printout t " CW illuminator lock-on " crlf ))
(def rul e ret
( FREQ no)
= >





























(printout t " Check IF RF range is 5 GHZ to
10GHZ
PRF range is 600 to 3000
PW range is 0.1 to 2.0 US
then this signal is Shipborne search radar or









(printout t " This signal is Fire Control Radar





(printout t " modulation on oscilloscope ? "
<yes> or <no> "crlf)
(assert (modul ation-on-Osci 1 1 oscope =(read))))
(defrule modul ation-on-Osci 1 loscope
(modul ation-on-Osci 1 1 oscope no)
r >
(printout t " This is Fire Control Radar or





(printout t " This signal could be conical scan




(printout t " RF < 10GHZ ?
PRF < 1500 PPS ?
PW < 1 . ?
If true
then this is commerical ship
else fishing boat Radar with
















(printout t " This is Mul ti -function surface
search radar
or Tracking radar " crlf))
(def rul e cal 1 ed
(sector-raster no)
- >
(printout t crlf " Is circular sacn ?
"crlf
)




(printout t crlf " Check the RF 5000 MHZ to
10 GHZ
PRF 600 to 3000
PW . 1 to 1 .0 US
IF true
then Shipborne search radar " crlf))
( def ru 1 e input
(circular no)
(printout t " Is steady scan ? " crlf)




(printout t " If strong audio then this
signal could be Tracking radara





(printout t " Check RF is 5000 MHZ to 10GHZ
PRF is 600 to 3000 PPS
PW is . 1 to 1 .0 US
IF true
then this signal is shipborne search radar
"crlf))
(defrule ji 1 1 er ( J I TTER-PRF no)
= >
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(printout t "Check frequency counter readout
if PRF stable
Then this is not jitter radar
go back to start (reset system) " crlf))
This is a rule base of EW for threat identification
file created by LCDR Wen Cheng Hsiung R.O.C Navy
(defrule signal-1
(f req ?x&: (>= ?x 8600)
)
(f req ?x&: (<= ?x 8800) )
(prf ?input&:(>= ?input 1150))
(prf ?input&:(<= ?input 1250))
(pw ?pulse&:(>= ?pulse 0.25))
(pw ?pulse&: (<= ?pulse 1.0))
(scan_rate ?call&:(>= ?call 3.6))
(scan_rate ?call&:(<= ?call 4.2))
= >
(printout t "This is Square Tie radar in navigation
mode" cr 1 f
)









(prf ?input&:(>= ?input 2000))
(prf ?input&:(<= ?input 2500))
(pw ?pulse&:(>= ?pulse 0.25))
( pw ?pulse&:(<= ?pulse 1.0))
(scan_rate ?call&:(>= ?call 2))
(scan_rate ?call&:(<= ?call 3))
= >
(printout t " This is Square Tie radar in Combat mode
! !
" crlf)
(printout t " fire chaff !!!" crlf)
(printout t " If no/low modulation fire IR flare
and
ECM choice countdown + swept-audio +noise ! ! ! " crlf))
(defrule signal-3
(f req ?x&: (>= ?x 9250)
)
(f req ?x&: (<= ?x 9500) )
(prf ?input&:(>= ?input 2000))
(prf ?input&:(<= ?input 2500))
(pw ?pulse&:(>= ?pulse 0.25))
(pw ?pulse&:(<= ?pulse 1.0))
(scan_rate ?call&:(>= ?call 2))
(scan_rate ?call&:(<= ?call 3))
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(printout t " This is Square Tie radar in Combat
mode ! ! " crlf
)
(printout t " fire chaff !!!" crlf)
(printout t " If no/low modulation fire IR flare
ECM choic countdown+swept-audio+noise ! ! ! " crlf))
(defrule signal-4
(f req ?x&: (>= ?x








?fact <- ( pw
?fact <- ( pw






printout t " This is
'crlf))
defrule signal-5
f req ?x&: (>= ?x 9350))















(&&( >= ?pulse 2)(<= ?pulse
?call 2.5))
?call 4))













printout t "this is C-class navigation radar"crlf))
defrule signal-6
(freq ?x&: (>= ?x 9200)
)
f req ?x&: (<= ?x 9400) )
prf ?input&
:
(> = ?input 3500) )
prf ? Inputs (< = ?input 4000) )
pw ?pul se& (> = ?pul se 0.2))
pw ?pul se& (< = ?pulse 0.4))
scan._rate ?cal 1 & : (>= ?call 3))
scan_rate ?call&:(<= ?call 4))
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= >






(f req ?x&: (<=
(prf ?input&
(prf ?input&
( pw ?pul se&
(pw ? pulse&






( >= ?pul se








This is E - class ss radar in
crlf))
(defrule signal-8




(<= ?x 8 600)












(printout t "This is an E-class surface search
radar in navigation mode " crlf))
(defrule signal-9
(f req ?x&: (>= ?:








? i n p u t S



















(printout t "This is an E-claj
radar in combat mode " crlf)
(printout t"Fire chaff and IR flare ! crlf"))
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(defrule signal-1-0
(f req ?x&: (>= ?x 200)
)
(freq ?x&: (<= ?x 210)
(prf ?input&:(>= ?input 250))
(prf ?inputS:(<= ?input 400))
(pw ?pulse&:(>= ?pulse 2.0))
(pw ?pulse&:(<= ?pulse 5.0))
(scan_rate ?call&:(>= ?call 12.0))















tout t "This is ?Type air search radar
f))
ul e signal -1-1
?x&: (>= ?x 5000) )





?pulse&:(< := ?pulse 0.5))
_rate ?cal 1&: (>=
11 3.6))

















eq ?x&: (>= ?x 1000)
eq ?x&: (<= ?x 1030)













?pul se 6.5 ) )
?pulse 8.0))
(>= ?call 3.5) )
can_rate ?call&:(<= ?call 4.0))
(printout t "This is AN/sps-58
radar" crlf))
(defrule signal-1-3
(freq ?x& : ( >= ?x 5400) )
(freq ?X& : (<= ?x 5600) )
(prf ?input&:(>= ?input 690))
(prf ?input&:(<= ?input 800))
(pw ?pulse&:(>= ?pulse 0.1))
low air-search
GS
(pw TpulseS:(<= T p u 1 s e 0.5))
(scan_rate TcallS:(>= ?call 3.5))
(scan_rate TcallS:(<= ?cal 1 4.5))
- >
(printout t " This is AN/sps-10 radar
(defrule s i g n a 1 - 1 - 4
crlf ))
















( > = ? i n p u t
(<= ?input
(>= ?pulse
( < = ? pu 1 s e
rate TcallS:(>= Tcall 3.0))
_rate Tcall&:(<= ?call 4.2))
TinputS
? i n p u t S







This is An/sps-65 radar" crlf))
C d e f r u 1 e signal -1-5
(f req ?x&: (> = Tx 2970) )




? p u 1 s e &
rate ?call&









( s c a n
( scan
- >










(<= ?cal 1 4.5))











? x & : ( < =
? inputs
? inputs
? pu 1 s e S




















( pr i ntout t
crlf))
(defrule signal -1-7
( f req ?x& : (>= ?x 9300) )
(freq ?x*<: (<= Tx 9450) )
(prf 7inputS:(>= Tinput 3500))
(prf 7inputS:(<= Tinput 4060))







( p r i n t
crlf )


























rate ?callS.:(> = ?call 2.0))
rate ?call&:(<= ?call 4.0))
out t "This is
)
?Type fire control radar'
signal -1-8





































t "This is ?Type Navigation radar
signa 1-1-9
:
( > = ? x 9400))
:(<= ?x 9 4 90))
putS<:(>= ?input
puts- : ( <= ?input
lse&: (>- ? p u 1 s e








(>= ?cal 1 2.0) )
(<= ?cal 1 3.0) )







( p r i
( ^F,S




ntout t "Enter the following data
intout t crlf " frequency in MHZ
er t ( f req = ( read ) ) )
ntout t crlf " PRF in PPS
ert (prf = ( read) ) )
ntout t crlf " Pulse width in us
ert ( pw = ( read ) ) )





1. Schleher, D. Curtis, Introduction to Electronic Warfare, Artech House, Inc.,
Norwood, Massachusetts, 19S6.
2. Griffiths, John, Radio Wave Propagation and Antennas, Prentice-Hall Inter-
national (UK) Ltd, Englewood Cliff, New Jersey, 1987.
3. "Navy's EW Requirements Increasingly Critical," ICH, 1980.
4. Van Brunt, Leroy B., Applied ECM, 5th edition, Vol. 1, EW Engineering,
Inc., Dunn Loring, Virginia, 1985.
5. Skolnik, Merrill I., Introduction to Radar Systems, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New
York, 1980.
6. Hoisington, D. B., "Introduction to Electronic Warfare Handouts," Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1990.
7. Wiley, Richard G., The Analysis of Radar Signals, Artech House, Inc., Nor-
wood, Massachusetts, 1982.
8. Winston, Patrick H., Artificial Intelligence, 2nd edition, Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., Reading, Massachusetts, 1984.
9. Lehner, Paul E., Artificial Intelligence and National Defense: Opportunity
and Challenge, Division of Tab Book, Inc., Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania,
1989.
10. Jackson, Peter, Introduction to Expert Systems, 2nd edition, Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., Reading, Massachusetts, 1990.
11. Giarratano, Joseph C, CLIPS User's Guide, Vol. 4.3, Artificial Intelligence




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002




4. Professor Yuh-jeng Lee, Code CS/Le 1
Department of Computer Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5. Professor Donald v. Z. Wadsworth, Code EC/Wd 1
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
6. LCdr. Hsiung Wen-Cheng, ROCN 5
18F, No. 40, GU00 Feng St., Tsoying

















c.l A prototype rule based
system for electronic
warfare.

